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The evolution of life on earth has been driven by a small number of
major evolutionary transitions. These have been characterized by
individuals that could previously replicate independently, cooper-
ating to form a new, more complex life form. For example, archaea
and eubacteria formed eukaryotic cells, and cells formed multicel-
lular organisms. But not all cooperative groups are on route to
major transitions. How can we explain why major evolutionary
transitions have or haven't taken place on different branches of
the tree of life? We break down major transitions into two steps,
the formation of a cooperative group and the transformation of
that group into an integrated entity. We show how these steps
require cooperation, division of labour, communication, mutual
dependence and negligible within group conﬂict. We ﬁnd that
certain ecological conditions and the ways in which groups form
have played recurrent roles in driving multiple transitions. In
contrast, we ﬁnd that other factors have played relatively minor
roles at many key points, such as within-group kin discrimination
and mechanisms to actively repress competition. More generally,
by identifying the small number of factors that have driven major
transitions, we provide a simpler and more uniﬁed description of
how life on earth has evolved.
cooperation j altruism j signalling j division of labour j conﬂict
The evolution of life, from simple organic compounds in a
primordial soup to the amazing diversity of contemporary organ-
isms, has taken roughly 3.5 billion years. How can we explain
the evolution of increasingly complex organisms over this period?
A traditional approach has been to consider the succession of
taxonomic groups, such as the age of fishes giving rise to the age
of amphibians, which gave way to the age of reptiles, and so on.
Whilst this approach has some uses, it is biased towards relatively
large plants and animals, and lacks a conceptual or predictive
framework, in that it suggests we look for different explanations
for each succession (1).
Twenty years ago, Maynard Smith & Szathmary (2) revo-
lutionized our understanding of life on earth by showing how
the key steps in the evolution of life on earth had been driven
by a small number of ‘major evolutionary transitions’. In each
transition, a group of individuals that could previously replicate
independently, cooperate to form a new, more complex life form.
For example, genes cooperate to form genomes, archaea and
eubacteria formed eukaryotic cells, and cells cooperate to form
multicellular organisms (Table 1).
The major transitions approach provides a conceptual frame-
work that facilitates comparison across pivotal moments in the
history of life (2, 3). It suggests that the same problem arises
at each transition – how are the potentially selfish interests of
individuals overcome to form mutually dependent cooperative
groups. We can then ask whether there are any similarities across
transitions in the answers to this problem. Consequently, rather
than looking for different explanations for the succession of
different taxonomic groups, we could potentially identify a few
key factors that have been important again and again at driving
increases in organismal complexity. This would both unify and
simplify our understanding of the evolution of life on earth.
We define the steps and processes in major transitions, and
show that the problem of explaining major transitions can be
broken down into six questions. We explore what is already
known about the factors facilitating transitions, examining the
extent to which we can generalise across the different transitions.
Ultimately, we are interested in the underlying evolutionary and
ecological factors that drive major transitions.
Defining major transitions
A major evolutionary transitions has been most broadly de-
fined as a change in the way that heritable information is stored
and transmitted (2). We focus on the subset of major transitions
which lead to a new form of individual (Table 1), where the
same problems arise, in a way that facilitates comparison, and so
exclude the transitions to sex and language (1, 2, 4, 5).
A major evolutionary transition in individuality is defined
by two conditions (1, 2). First, entities that were capable of
independent replication before the transition can only replicate
as part of a larger unit after it. This is termedmutual dependence,
interdependence or contingent irreversibility. Second, there is a
relative lack of within-group conflict such that the larger unit can
be thought of as a fitness-maximizing individual (or organism) in
its own right. For example, it is common to think of the nucleus
and organelles of a eukaryotic cell, or the group of cells that
makes up a multicellular animal, as a single organism (6).
When these two conditions are met, evolution can lead to
a new higher level individual (organism). This is because we
have a group that can’t be broken up (condition 1), and we
can conceptualise the group acting with a single purpose, where
the interests of the previously independent individuals are now
aligned (condition 2). We provide examples of how this definition
can be applied in Table 1. A precise definition matters, because a
blurring of exactly what is being examined can obscure the relative
importance of the underlying selective forces (7, 8).
Steps
Major evolutionary transitions can be divided into two steps:
(1) the formation of a cooperative group, and (2) the trans-
formation of the cooperative group into a more cohesive and
integrated entity that can be considered a new level of individual
(organisms) (Fig. 1) (1, 2). The second step typically involves
a number of common features, including: the individuals in a
group evolving to perform different tasks (division of labor);
division of labour becoming so specialised that the members of
the group become dependent upon each other; communication
to coordinate cooperation at the group level.
Whilst these two steps may not have clear borders, and can
move gradually from one to the next, they can occur in some











































































































































Table 1. The major evolutionary transitions in individuality. 1Highly integrated / obligate symbioses, where the hosts cannot survive
without their symbionts, and there appears to be a relative lack of conﬂict, such that the symbionts can best increase their own ﬁtness
by helping their hosts reproduce (45). 2Facultatively multicellular species, which can remain in their unicellular state for many
generations, without the need to form a multicellular fruiting body, which they do only under certain harsh conditions to increase
dispersal success (no mutual dependence) (37). Sufﬁcient conﬂict to select for non-cooperative cheats, and within group kin
discrimination (67, 68). 3Facultatively eusocial species, where queens are still able to breed if the workers/soldiers are removed (no
mutual dependence). 4Hosts are able to grow and replicate without these symbionts (no mutual dependence), and there is sufﬁcient
conﬂict to select for non-cooperative cheats(69).
Major Transitions Not Major transitions








































Some obligate endosymbionts, e.g.
Buchnera in aphids1. Leaf cutter ants and
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Fig. 1. A major evolutionary transition involves two steps. First, the
formation of a cooperative group. Second, the transition to a new level
of organism, with division of labour, interdependence and coordination of
the parts. Whilst the ﬁrst step is well understood, the second is not. We
follow Bourke, except he divides transitions into three steps, distinguishing
between maintenance and transformation (1).
order (1). For example, in transitions involving members of the
same species, we would not expect division of labour to evolve
until after cooperative groups have formed. Consequently, the
benefits of having different cell types in multicellular organisms
may not provide an explanation for why multicellular groups
initially formed. In contrast, with transitions between members
of different species, individuals can be specialized to perform
different tasks before the formation of cooperative groups, and
group transformation involves specialization to help each other.
What are the big questions?
We suggest six questions that are key to understanding the
evolutionary and ecological drivers of major transitions:
Q1. What conditions favour the formation of cooperative
groups?
Q2. What conditions maintain cooperation during group
transformation?
Q3. What conditions favour division of labour?
Fig. 2. The hypotheticals level of cooperative helping in a symbiont plotted
against the relatedness between the symbionts infecting a host. If the
hosts sanction uncooperative symbionts, then a high level of cooperation
is predicted, relatively independent of relatedness. If the hosts do not carry
out sanctions, then the level of cooperation is predicted to depend strongly
upon relatedness (23).
Q4. What conditions favour communication that coordinates
cooperation at the group level?
Q5.What conditions lead to negligible conflict within groups?
Q6. What conditions favour mutual dependence?
Question 1 concerns the first step in a major transition (the










































































































































Submission PDFFig. 3. The relationship between the proportion of resources invested into atrait (A) and the ﬁtness return from that trait. We assume that a proportionof resources X is put intro trait A, and the remaining proportion 1-X into
trait B.
Fig. 4. The individual and the group. The hypothetical level of a cooperative
trait, such as the amount of an extracellular factor produced by bacterial
cells, plotted against the extent of conﬂict between interacting individuals.
The different lines show the optimal strategy from the perspective of an
individual’s inclusive ﬁtness (blue line) and group ﬁtness (red line). Natural
selection will lead to the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which will be
the strategy thatmaximises inclusive ﬁtness (i.e., the blue line), irrespective of
the consequences at the group level. We would only expect natural selection
to lead to maximisation of group ﬁtness, and hence think of the group as
a ﬁtness-maximizing individual, in extreme cases where there is no within
group conﬂict.
concern the second step in a major transition (the transformation
of the cooperative group into a new level of individuality; Fig.
1). We have divided these questions to identify specific research
problems. Our division emphasizes that major transitions are not
just about cooperation or extreme altruism (sterility), they are
about an extreme form of cooperation, involving multiple traits,
division of labour, mutual dependence and a lack of conflict.
Q1 & 2: What conditions favour cooperation?
The first step in a major transition is that individuals come to-
gether and form a cooperative group. Cooperation then needs to
be maintained whilst group transformation takes place. We con-
sider the factors that may favour the formation and maintenance
of cooperative groups together because the same selective forces
can be involved. A trait is cooperative if it provides a benefit to
another individual, and has evolved at least partially because of
that benefit (8). The problem of cooperation is that, all else being
equal, cooperators could be exploited and outcompeted by non-
cooperators (cheats), who gain the benefits from the cooperation
of others, but avoid the cost of cooperating (9). The evolution of
cooperation requires two conditions (1, 10-12). First there is some
ecological or efficiency benefit to cooperation. Second, there is
some mechanism that leads to the benefits of cooperation being
directed back to the cooperator and/or their relatives.
(1) Ecological or efficiency benefits: The ecological benefits
of cooperation have been well studied in many taxa. Cells form
cooperative multicellular clumps to evade predators, make more
efficient use of factors that are excreted from individual cells,
and form fruiting bodies that aid dispersal (1, 13). Cooperation
between different species often involves a symbiont providing a
service, such as resource that allows their host to better grow (14-
16). Cooperation is favoured in eusocial species to care for young
over an extended period where the parent may die, or to defend
a valuable resource (17).
(2) Mechanism to direct benefits back (within species): Co-
operation can be favoured if the benefits go to relatives who carry
the same genes for cooperation, termed kin selection (18). By
helping a close relative reproduce, an individual is still passing
on copies of its genes to the next generation, just indirectly. Kin
selection is often encapsulated with Hamilton’s rule (18), which
predicts that altruistic cooperation will be favoured when rB-
C>0, where C is the fitness cost to the altruist, B is the fitness
benefit to the beneficiary and r is their genetic relatedness. This
shows that altruism can be favoured when the indirect benefits
of helping relatives (rB) outweigh the direct costs (C). There is a
large empirical literature supporting the role of relatedness, and
showing how a high relatedness can arise either through limited
dispersal, which keeps relatives together, or kin discrimination,
where cooperation is preferentially directed towards relatives (1,
11)
Cooperation can be favoured between non-relatives in the
same species if it provides a direct benefit to the cooperator.
For example, when unrelated ants cooperate to increase their
chance of founding a new colony (19). It can also occur via
mechanisms that reward cooperators or punish non-cooperators,
such as reciprocity (20). In these cases, the costs incurred by
cooperating are outweighed by the benefits received in return,
and so cooperation is mutually beneficial rather than altruistic.
(3) Mechanism to direct benefits (between species): Coop-
eration between species also requires mechanisms that lead to
the benefits of cooperation being directed back to the cooperator
and/or their relatives (21). Broadly speaking, two mechanisms
are likely to be important for producing this feedback. The first
mechanism is if individuals tend to be associated in such a way
that their fitness become entwined (partner-fidelity feedback)
(12). For example, in a vertically transmitted clonal symbiont,
then helping the host could increase the number of host offspring
that the symbiont would be transmitted to. Relatedness among
the symbionts matters because it determines who receives the
benefits of helping the host, and hence whether cheats could
exploit the cooperation (22) (Fig. 2). A high relatedness among
vertically transmitted symbionts in a host is likely to be important











































































































































Fig. 5. The way in which groups form is a major determinant of when major transitions have taken place, because it determines the potential for within-
group conﬂict. Within-species transitions have only taken place when offspring stay to help their parents (subsocial) and either asexual reproduction of
lifetime monogamy (36, 37, 40). Between-species transitions appear to involve similarly restrictive group formation, such as vertical transmission leading to
clonal symbionts whose interests are aligned with their hosts. The images, from left to right show: human, Chlamydomonas, Atta ants, Stenogastrine hover
wasp, mitochondrion, Hamiltonella defensa (in the aphid), Dictyostelium, splendid fairy wren, and Rhizobia mutualism.
The second mechanism is if the host preferentially rewards
more cooperative symbionts and/or punishes less cooperative
symbionts (23). For example, legumes provide more resources to
more cooperative rhizobia, and squid eliminate symbiotic bacte-
ria that do not luminesce (24, 25). Such ‘sanctions’ mechanisms
can favour cooperation even when symbiont relatedness is low at
the level of the host (Fig. 2).
Q3: What conditions favour division of labour?
Organisms must perform a number of tasks to survive and re-
produce. When will natural selection favour a division of labour,
with different individuals performing different tasks? To illustrate
this with a specific example, consider two tasks, A and B. We
assume that investment into these two activities must be traded
off against each other as time and energy spent on A cannot be
spent on B. Division of labour will tend to be favoured when the
shape of the relationship between the proportion of resources
allocated to each task and the fitness return is accelerating (Fig.
3) (2). The fitness return might be accelerating if a task becomes
more efficient as more effort is put into it, or if tasks A and
B don’t mix well. In contrast, if the fitness returns on tasks are
decelerating then it can be more efficient to have all individuals
perform some A and some B.
There are numerous examples of division of labour. In the
volvocine algae, there appears to be an advantage to having a di-
vision between large cells that reproduce and small cells who beat
their flagella to keep the colony afloat (5). In some cyanobacteria,
there is a division between cells that photosynthesise and cells that
fix nitrogen into ammonium (heterocysts) – this division appears
to be favoured because nitrogenase, the enzyme that converts
nitrogen gas to ammonia, is rapidly destroyed in the presence of
oxygen (26). Symbioses by definition involve a division of labour,
with partners providing different services for each other. In some
cases, one partner will provide a service that the other part-
ner cannot perform, such as the intracellular chemoautotrophic
bacterial symbionts that provide nutrition for marine flatworms
lacking a digestive tract (27). Hosts can sometimes harbor mul-
tiple symbionts, with different symbionts performing different
tasks (28). Mitochondria and plastids provide clear examples of
extreme specialization in transitions between species.
The general principle is that a division of labour will be
favoured when there are efficiency benefits to specialization (Fig.
3). There is a lack of research showing why this will be the
case in specific systems. Both theoretical models demonstrating
how trade-offs between different traits can lead to benefits of
specialization, and empirical studies measuring these trade-offs,
are required to address this gap (29). Furthermore, our discussion
has ignored many complexities. For example, how would factors
such as within group conflict, variation in relatedness or different
abilities to coordinate at the group level influence selection for
division of labour?
Q4:What conditions favour communication that coordinates
cooperation at the group level?
Communication can be key to all stages of a major transition,
playing multiple roles in the formation and transformation of
cooperative groups. For example, coordinating cooperation and
the division of labour at the group level. However, communi-
cation systems are potentially exploitable by cheats who fail to
respond to signals, or who signal dishonestly (30). Individuals
could ignore signals to cooperate, or could signal in a way to
make others cooperate more. What maintains the honesty of the
communication systems that help drive major transitions?
Theory has shown that honest signaling requires either that
signals can’t be faked (indices), signals are costly to fake (hand-
icaps), and/or the sender and receiver have a common interest
(30). A common interest is particularly relevant in major tran-
sitions because the same conditions that favour cooperation can
also favour honest communication – high relatedness or aligned
reproductive interests. The importance of high relatedness in
favouring honest signaling within cooperative groups has been
demonstrated experimentally with quorum sensing (QS), the
process whereby bacteria use small signal molecules to regulate
the production of extracellular factors that aid growth, motility
and biofilm formation. QS is favoured at high relatedness, and
disfavoured at low relatedness (31). Common interest presumably
explains a range of signals in cases where major transitions have
been made, from the waggle dance of the honey bee to among
cell coordination in animals. Comparative studies could examine
how communication systems vary across species that differ in their
degree of conflict.
Symbioses involve many forms of communication, including
the acquisition of symbionts from the environment, to the co-
ordination of tasks. Specific cases range from partnerships in
which effective communication allows both partners to prosper,











































































































































to manipulate the other for selfish gain. With luminous bacteria
and their squid hosts, there appears to be a mutual interest
in coordinating rhythms such that bacterial luminescence peaks
when hosts most need the camouflage provided by the bacteria.
This coordination involves the host genes being regulated by the
light and molecules produced by the bacteria (32). In other cases,
conflict among partners is higher, and signals may be used to
manipulate others.
Q5: What conditions lead to negligible conflict within
groups?
Even when there are clear benefits to evolving cooperation,
conflicts can still arise in cooperative groups. Evolutionary theory
predicts that individuals are adapted to maximize their inclusive
fitness, even if this comes at a cost to other individuals or the
group (18). Inclusive fitness is the sum of an individuals influence
on their own reproductive success and that of related individuals.
This leads to the question of what conditions would be required
for individuals maximizing their own inclusive fitness, to also be
maximizing of the fitness of the group (33) (Fig. 4). We focus on
inclusive fitness because it is under the full control of the actor,
and so represents a measure of fitness that could be maximized
(34). It is useful to consider within and between species transitions
separately.
Within species transitions: What does the empirical data
show? Group formation appears to play a key role in whether a
major transition to multicellularity or eusociality can take place
(Fig. 5) (1, 35-37). The major transition to obligate multicel-
lularity has only taken place in species where daughter cells
stick together after division and so group formation is clonal,
such as the animals, fungi, red algae, green plants, volvocine
algae, brown algae, some ciliates and some cyanobacteria (37,
38). Although non-clonal group formation occurs via aggregation
in many species, such as the cellular slime moulds, ciliates, and
acrasid slime moulds, and can lead to very high relatedness (39),
it has only led to facultative multicellularity.
Similarly, the transitions to both facultative and obligate
eusociality have only taken place in species where offspring stay to
help their parents, and there is either strict lifetimemonogamy, or
asexual reproduction (35, 36, 40). Multiple mating and multiple
queens occur in some eusocial species, but they are derived states
that evolved after eusociality was fixed.Whilst cooperation occurs
in many species where females mate multiple times, such as the
cooperative breeding birds and mammals, this has never led to a
major transition to obligate eusociality (41).
Group formation: How groups form is important because of
its influence on relatedness and conflict. Consider a focal individ-
ual who is choosing to either: (i) perform a cooperative behaviour
that helps another individual produce B offspring, to whom the
focal actor is related rh, or (ii) to produceC of their own offspring
to whom they are related by ro . In this case, helping is favoured if
rhB-roC>0, which represents a form of Hamilton’s rule. However,
we are interested not in whether helping is favoured, but whether
there is conflict between different individuals over whether to
help. Conflict occurs when individuals disagree about the best
strategy (6).
What conditions would be required to remove conflict be-
tween the helpers (workers) in a social group, such that they could
be considered a single maximizing unit? One way to achieve this
would be if the potential helper is equally related to the offspring
that it could help raise and its own offspring (rh=ro) (33, 35-37).
In this case, the different offspring are worth equal value to the
potential helper, and they are selected to do whatever leads to the
production of the most offspring, which will depend upon B and
C. In a sexual species, this arises with strict lifetime monogamy,
where potential helpers are aiding their parents, such that they are
helping rear full siblings (rh=ro=1/2). In an asexual species, these
conditions arise in clonal groups (rh=ro=1), which also removes
conflict between helpers and their parent. Multicellularity and
eusociality have only evolved under these conditions.
Our above discussion makes clear that we need to specify
whom we are considering potential conflict between, and their
behavioural options. We have considered conflict among helpers,
and not between helpers and their parents. This is reasonable in
large colonies where the workers are effectively in control, but not
in smaller colonies or when the reproductives can still wield power
over factors such as caste or sex ratio. Consequently, factors such
as colony size and caste determination can influence whether a
major transition can be made, because they will determine the
impact of conflict between queens andworkers at the colony level.
Conflict can still arise over other decisions in monogamous
species, such as when the decision a helper faces is not whether
to help raise full siblings. In Melipona bees, conflict arises as to
whether individuals rear their own offspring, or their niblings
(nieces and nephews), resulting in a wasteful 5-14% of individuals
competing to become queens (42). A general issue here is that
the Hamilton’s rule approach is relatively heuristic, and explicit
theory is required to determine when different individuals within
a social group will act as a single maximizing agent (33).
Repression: Another way to eliminate within-group conflict
is if there is complete repression of competition within groups,
such that individuals cannot increase their reproductive success
via any form of cheating (33, 43). As with the relatedness scenario
described above, repression of competition unites the interest of
the group. Repression of competition has been important in some
social hymenoptera, where workers destroy or “police” the eggs
laid by other workers (44). For example, in the honeybee, worker
policing is so efficient, that workers are effectively selected to not
try to reproduce.
Haplodiploidy: Our above discussion of eusociality ignored
the complication of haplodiploidy. In diploids, when offspring
stay to help their monogamous parents, the helpers are equally
related to offspring that they could help raise and their own off-
spring (ro=rh=1/2). This same condition holds in haplodiploids if
helpers cannot differentiate between male and female offspring.
However, if we allow for the possibility thatmales and females can
be distinguished from each other, then we find that workers are
more related to: (a) their own sons (r = 0.5) than their brothers
(r = 0.25); (b) their sisters (r = 0.75) than their daughters
(r = 0.5); (c) their daughters (r = 0.5) than their brothers (r
= 0.25); (d) their nephews (r = 0.375) than their brothers (r
= 0.25). These relatedness asymmetries can lead to conflicts
between workers in haplodiploid species where diploidy would
not. Consequently, haplodiploidy hinders major transitions, such
that haplodiploid species can require an extra step. Monogamy
and sufficient ecological benefit of cooperation can take species
to obligate eusociality (35, 40), and in the case of diploids, a major
transition. But then, in haplodiploids, an extra step is required to
suppress conflict and complete a major transition – for example,
the evolution of multiple mating leading to worker policing (44).
This emphasizes that, in haplodiploids, mating frequency can
have different roles at different stages, with monogamy required
to make the transition to obligate eusociality, but then multiple
mating driving from eusociality to a major transition.
Transitions between species: Less attention has been paid to
what conditions lead to reduced within-group conflict in between
species transitions. Again, the way in which groups form may
be key. There will be no conflict between vertically transmitted
clonal symbionts, who could only transmit to more individuals
by increasing the reproductive success of their host. Examples
which appear to lack conflict include mitochondria, plasmids,
the various secondary and tertiary plastid endosymbiosis, and
possibly the Buchnera bacteria that infect aphids (14, 45). In
contrast, both the opportunity for horizontal transmission, and











































































































































for less cooperative symbionts (22, 46). Consistent with the pre-
dicted role of transmission route, the evolutionary transition from
a parasitic to a mutualistic lifestyle in a range of bacterial lineages
is associated with the loss of horizontal transmission (47).
Repression of competition could play a role in transitions
between species. Sanction mechanisms appear to be more com-
mon in partnerships when symbionts transmit horizontally, where
we predict that there will be more conflict to resolve, such as
in partnerships with root symbionts, luminous symbionts and
pollinator mutualisms (24, 25, 48, 49).
Hosts could structure or transmit their symbionts in a way
that better aligns their interests and removes conflict. However,
mechanisms that repress competition, such as reducing symbiont
diversity, will only be favoured if they have an immediate fitness
benefit, and not because they will select for more cooperative
symbionts in the future (46). For example, leaf-cutter ants actively
remove foreign mycelial fragments, to prevent incompatibility
interactions that can reduce fungal garden productivity,which this
has the byproduct benefit of more closely aligning the interests of
the ants and their fungi over evolutionary time (50). A general
problem here is that we lack formal theory for the conditions
required to eliminate conflict in between-species transitions.
Q6: What conditions favour mutual dependence?
In many cases, if a cooperative group is broken up, then
individuals are still able to reproduce. In contrast, cases can
arise in which different members of the group have lost the
capacity for independent replication they once had. For example,
mitochondria cannot reproduce without the rest of the eukaryotic
cell, and higher termite queens cannot reproducewithout the help
of their workers. In most cases, mutual dependence appears to
arise as a result of extreme division of labour. Individuals become
so specialised that they lose the ability to perform other tasks. The
question here is what conditions favour the loss of any potential to
perform certain tasks that are necessary to replication? Why did
higher termite queens lose the ability to feed / rear their offspring,
and their workers lose the ability to produce offspring? There is
an almost complete lack of work addressing why certain traits are
lost, both generally and for specific cases (51).
Presumably, there is some efficiency benefit from becoming
irreversibly specialised, which will depend upon a range of bi-
ological factors, such as how groups are formed (relatedness),
mortality rates, and how those that reproduce (breeders) are re-
placed. Symbionts offer excellent opportunities for comparative
studies on the evolutionary and ecological correlates of mutual
dependence. For example, why does the interaction between
photosynthetic symbionts and their hosts vary from the obligate
symbiosis typified by plastids in plants to ciliates that can ‘culture’
the chloroplasts found in their algal food (45, 52, 53). Are partner-
ships in which symbionts access and deliver new forms of energy
for their hosts, more likely to lead to major transitions than cases
where the symbionts provide a resource that the host can also
obtain directly. Repression of competition can also favour mutual
dependence, as demonstrated by the influence of worker policing
on whether hymenopteran workers develop ovaries (44).
Genetic drift can play a role in the evolution of mutual de-
pendence. When symbionts have small asexual populations, drift
can be a significant factor, leading to the inactivation and even-
tual deletion of mildly beneficial genes (54). As symbionts lose
functionality in traits or structures, such as transporters and cell
walls, the host may evolve to take over these roles, co-adapting in
a way that leads to mutual dependence. Similarly, hosts can lose
traits that the symbionts perform. Oligochaete worms have lost
the ability to excrete their ownwaste, relying instead onmetabolic
pathways introduced by endosymbionts to provide and process
nutrients (55), while coral hosts (e.g. Acropora sp.) have lost their
Cysteine synthesis pathway in favor of symbiont derived sources
(56).Whenmultiple symbiont lineages are within a host, different
lineages may lose different traits, such that multiple symbionts
and the host can become interdependent (28).
Conflict and Maximising agents
A major transition requires that there is a relative lack of
within group conflict such that a larger unit can be thought of as a
fitness-maximising agent (individual or organism) in its own right.
We are interested in when a group can be considered a fitness-
maximizing agent for at least three reasons (6, 34). First, the
maximizing agent analogy informs us when group level adaptation
will occur (33). Almost all interesting traits and behaviours are
the construction of multiple entities (genes, cells etc) pulling
in the same direction cooperatively, with minimal conflict. If
there is negligible conflict, and we can think of a group as single
maximizing agent, then we can expect adaptation at the group
level, to maximize the fitness of the group, and hence substantial
increases in organismal complexity. For example, clonal multicel-
lular groups have led to animals and plants, whereas non-clonal
multicellular groups have only led to things like slime moulds.
Second, this analogy facilitates progress at the interface of
theory and data in evolutionary biology (34). It allows us to think
about a single, individual-level agent, rather than trillions of cell
or gene level agents. By black boxing these lower layers, we can
focus on other aspects of biology such as ecology and behavior,
making it easier to develop models and test the robustness of
those models to changes in the underlying biological parameters.
Nonetheless, this is a heuristic approach that should only be used
when the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, which is best
judged empirically (57). Third, a focus on maximizing agents
makes it easier to identify potential conflicts, and determine how
they are resolved, both between and within individuals. For exam-
ple, how conflict can arise over who produces male offspring in
haplodiploid social insects, and how this is suppressed by worker
policing (44).
More generally, we emphasise that the fundamental question
being asked with major transitions is one of individuality, and
not other issues such as sterility, altruism, complexity, ecological
impact or whether gene transfer has occurred (33). Whilst traits
such as sterility raise important evolutionary questions, and can
be correlated with whether a major transition has occurred, they
are neither necessary nor sufficient for amajor transition. Indeed,
other examples of complete altruism can be found, which are
clearly notmajor transitions, including bacteria bursting suicidally
to release factors that reduce competition (58).
Pragmatism
Identifying whether a major transition has been made is an
empirical problem, where pragmatism can be important. From
a theoretical perspective, we can identify the ideal qualities that
would unequivocally define individuality and identify when a ma-
jor transition has been made. For example, we can examine what
conditions would lead to no conflict, such as clonality or complete
repression of competition (33). In the real world, conflict between
genes or cells can still exist. For example, in animals and plants
there is still some opportunity for conflict among genes, and
somatic mutation can lead to conflicts among cells (6, 59, 60).
Our aim is to consider when there is so little conflict that the
consequences for the group can be effectively ignored.
Whether there is negligible conflict and the group acts as a
fitness maximizing agent can be trait dependent, even within an
organism. For example, whilst we expect plant traits controlled by
nuclear genes tomaximize plant fitness, we know that cytoplasmic
genes can select for male sterility, to their own selfish benefit.
Similarly, in ants such as Formica exsecta, we can assume that the
different ants are behaving as a single maximising unit for traits
such as foraging, refuse disposal etc, whilst there is also clear con-
flict between the queen and the workers over sex allocation (61).
What is key is not to argue whether a certain species has made











































































































































us understand the processes that lead to major transitions. For
examining what conditions lead to greater mutual dependence or
lower conflict. Evolution is a process of continuous change and so
we should expect blurry edges with a mosaic of features (1).
Pragmatism is also required when considering whether the
members of a group are mutually dependent. We are not saying
that mutual dependence can never be reversed by evolution –
mitochondria have been lost in some parasites of humans, and
plastids have been lost multiple times (45, 62). Instead, our aim is
to consider whether the breaking up of a group would prevent
replication. Related to this, all organisms are dependent upon
other organisms to be able to reproduce, and we are considering
mutual dependence relative to a defined social group. For exam-
ple, we can ask whether the cells that make up a male lion are
mutually dependent upon each other, even though that male is
also dependent upon a female lion to mate with, zebras to eat,
grass to feed those zebras and so on.
The world made simpler
Maynard Smith & Szathmary offered a mixture of explana-
tions for the different transitions, suggesting that a diversity of
factors were at play (2). We suggest that both theoretical and
empirical advances have provided a more unified explanation for
the different major transitions. Major transitions require extreme
conditions, with certain factors being either consistently impor-
tant, or consistently unimportant.
First, at a very general level, the same two factors play a
key role in answering all six questions that we posed: (i) an
ecological benefit to cooperation and (ii) a mechanism to unite
the interests of different individuals. Consequently, the same
ecological and evolutionary conditions can provide the answers
to all six questions. For example, the combination of clonality
and the right ecological benefit can remove within group conflict
(Q5), and favour cooperation (Q1&2), division of labour (Q3),
honest communication (Q4) and mutual dependence (Q6).
Second, at a more specific level, both theory and data sug-
gest that how social groups form has played an analogous and
fundamental role, across the different major transitions (Fig. 5).
The within species transitions to multicellularity and eusociality
have only occurred when (i) the social group passes through a
single propagule phase (cell or singlymated female), (ii) the social
group forms by offspring staying to help their parent (subsocial-
ity) (35-37, 40). We suggest that transitions between species may
involve similarly restrictive conditions, such as vertical transmis-
sion of clonal symbionts.
Third, the restrictive conditions required for a major transi-
tionmake it easier to understandwhere andwhymajor transitions
have not taken place. For example, why there have been no
major transitions in promiscuous cooperative breeders or multi-
cellular groups formed by aggregation. A major transition is not
simply driven by satisfying Hamilton’s rule (Q1&2), it is about
conflict being sufficiently eliminated that the group acts as a
single maximizing agent (Q5). Consequently, a lower relatedness
(r) cannot just be made up for with a greater ecological benefit
to cooperation (B/C). This means we would not expect major
transitions with certain life histories, such as promiscuity or non-
clonal aggregation (33, 35).
Fourth, there are striking similarities in the ecological ben-
efits to cooperation that have driven different transitions. The
eusocial insects can be divided depending upon whether the
evolution of eusociality was driven by either the advantage in
forming defensive groups (e.g. termites, aphids) or the efficiency
benefit gained from cooperating to rear young (e.g. hymenoptera)
(17). The ecological benefits to multicellularity seem to divide
along analogous lines due to the benefits of forming defensive
groups (e.g. algae) or to make certain traits more efficient (e.g.
yeast, slimemoulds) (13, 63). Canwemake similar generalisations
about the transitions between species?
Fifth, within group kin discrimination appears to have played
a limited role in helping within species major transitions. The
transitions to obligate multicellularity and obligate eusociality
have only taken place in clonal or monogamous populations
(ro=rh), where there is no or limited potential for kin discrimina-
tion. Consequently, whilst kin discrimination can be important in
facultatively multicellular species or cooperative breeders, this is
only when they have appreciable variation in within-group relat-
edness (64), which also prevents major transitions. Furthermore,
some cases of kin discrimination, such as haplodiploid females
favouring sons over brothers, increases rather than decreases
conflict, and so disfavor rather than favour major transitions. An
important exception is the involvement of kin discrimination in
the worker policing of the haplodiploid social insects (44).
Sixth, repression of competition appears to have played a
limited role in helping within species major transitions. The tran-
sitions to obligate multicellularity and obligate eusociality have
only taken place in clonal or monogamous populations (ro=rh),
where there is no or limited competition to be suppressed. Fur-
thermore, theory suggests that it is hard to evolve the complete
repression of competition that would be required for amajor tran-
sition, because the marginal benefits of repressing competition
will often plateau, such that an intermediate level of repression
will be favoured (65). As with kin discrimination, an important
exception is policing in the haplodiploid social insects (44).
Considering transitions between species, the relative role of
repression of competition is less clear, but may also be rela-
tively unimportant. In many cases, vertical inheritance of clonal
symbionts may mean that there is no competition to repress.
With horizontal transmission of symbionts, sanction mechanisms
that reward cooperators and / or punish non-cooperators can
be favoured (23, 24), but these may not be able to suppress
competition enough for a major transition to occur.
Future Directions
We conclude by emphasizing that many of the ideas in this
paper are tentative. Major theoretical issues remain unanswered,
and empirical work has only begun to tackle the issues surround-
ing the major questions. Insights can be obtained from studies of
species that haven’t made major transitions, as well as those that
have, or by comparing across species that have transitioned to a
different extent.
First, whilst we have a relatively good understanding of co-
operation (Q1&2), we have a much poorer understanding of
group transformation (Q3-6). In cases where we have a good
understanding, this often raises other questions – for example,
how groups form is important, but how can we explain variation
in the way in which groups form?
Second, we have a much better understanding of the within-
species transitions than the between-species transitions. The
within-species transitions have been easier to study because they
have happened both more often, and usually more recently than
transitions such as the evolution of the eukaryote cell or the
genome. Advances in genomic methodologies are allowing divi-
sion of labour and mutual dependence to be much better studied
in endosymbionts and organelles (15, 28, 45, 66).
Third, the applicability of the fitness maximizing agent anal-
ogy to certain scenarios remains to be explored. For example,
what are the consequences of horizontal gene transfer in bacteria,
or cultural evolution (social learning) in humans? There is a lack
of formal theory examining the conditions required to remove
conflict, and hence lead to a group acting as a single maximizing
unit, especially for between-species transitions (33).
Fourth, we have focused on determining the ultimate se-
lective forces that have favoured major transitions. Mechanistic
details can matter if they predispose certain species to making
transitions. For example, if bacteria are able to acquire resources











































































































































the tissues and cells of eukaryotes, and exchange symbiotic loci
horizontally. Can generalisations be made about the role of pre-
dispositions within or between transitions?
Finally, we have focused on the route to making a major
transition. Once a major transition has been made, evolution can
lead to scenarios that reintroduce conflict into the group. For
example, multicellular groups can become so large that mutation
becomes an appreciable problem, and eusocial insects can evolve
multiple mating or multiple queens (40, 59). In addition, mutual
dependence can break down, allowing major transitions to be
reversed, as has occurred with both mitochondria and plastids.
Genomic reduction could lead to endosymbionts becoming so
ineffective that they are lost or replaced (54). These points raise
at least two more questions:
Q7. How are new conflicts of interest suppressed in groups
that have already made a major transition?
Q8. What conditions favour the break down of major transi-
tions?
As when considering Q1-6, the beauty of the major transition
approach is that it facilitates the identification of general patterns.
How important are repression of conflict mechanisms for keeping
down conflicts that arise after transitions have been made, such
as suppressors of selfish genes or cancer (1, 60)? Do major
transitions tend to break down because of new conflicts arising,
or because the ecological benefits change? A new era of research
focused on the commonalties in the major transitions across the
tree of life is positioned to tackle these questions.
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